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Why do Firms have ‘Purpose’? The Firm’s Role as a Carrier of
Identity and Reputation
By Rebecca Henderson and Eric Van den Steen∗
Why do so many firms publicly espouse
a ‘purpose’ beyond simple profit maximiza-
tion? And why do so many managers and
employees appear to care deeply about this
purpose and to believe that it is critically
important?
The consumer goods giant Unilever, for
example, has committed to obtaining 100%
of its agricultural inputs from sustainable
sources by 2020, while Henry Schein, a dis-
tributor of medical and dental products,
claims that one of its most important goals
is the ‘expansion of care to at risk groups’.
Both firms appear to believe that purpose
is critical to their success, even though it
seems to imply significant costs without ob-
vious commensurate gains.
While the economics literature suggests
some potential explanations for the em-
brace of purpose, none seems to account
for four closely related observations - de-
rived from our own observations and the
management literature – that seem critical.
First, firm purpose appears to be almost in-
variably directed towards a prosocial goal,
i.e., it offers some benefit to society. Sec-
ond, employees usually care deeply about
the firm’s purpose: they know it and are of-
ten passionate about it. Third, this seems
to hold true even for employees like accoun-
tants whose work is far removed from the
activities that actually fulfill the purpose,
and even when the firm’s actions may seem
to be somewhat modest. This seems sur-
prising: while a hospital nurse may derive
motivation and satisfaction from the intrin-
sic value of her work with patients, it seems
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unlikely that the hospital’s accountant will
derive the same type of satisfaction from
doing the accounting. Fourth, firms try to
show that the social engagement is ‘authen-
tic’ in the sense that it is not done simply
to make money. Motivation seems to count
as much as action.
These observations appear to run counter
to much of the existing literature. Consider
first the common argument that firms that
embrace purpose are ‘doing well by doing
good,’ or that the pursuit of purpose of-
ten also directly increases profits. Be´nabou
and Tirole (2010) argue that this can make
sense either when purpose can compensate
for some form of managerial myopya, or
when the firm’s customers directly value the
social impact.1 But if this is the case, why
would most purposes be prosocial? Why
would authenticity be important? A sec-
ond set of explanations comes from the or-
ganizational economics literature that ex-
plores ‘vision’ and ‘mission’. In particu-
lar, Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) showed
that a manager’s bias towards a particu-
lar course of action can increase employ-
ees’ effort and investments, whereas Van
den Steen (2005) showed that it can give di-
rection, improve coordination, and attract
employees with similar beliefs and values,
which can then solve a range of agency
problems (Van den Steen 2010). But why
would such a vision be focused on a proso-
cial purpose? And why would managers
seek to avoid the impression that having a
purpose is simply the profitable thing to do?
1Be´nabou and Tirole (2010) further suggest ‘dele-
gated philanthropy’ as another explanation and argue
that this may be effective when the firm is better at some
philanthropic activity than its employees and sharehold-
ers. But it’s unclear – at least in the absence of other
motivations – why such delegated philanthropy is not
done on a voluntary basis (like any other philanthropi-
cal organization) instead of bundling it with share own-
ership or employment.
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In this article, we propose that a firm’s
purpose can create value – beyond its so-
cial impact – by developing or strength-
ening employees’ identity and reputation.2
We define ‘purpose’ as a concrete goal or
objective for the firm that reaches beyond
profit maximization; a person’s ‘reputation’
as others’ beliefs about that person, i.e.,
about her type; and a person’s ‘identity’
as her own beliefs about herself and her
type.3 Our analysis builds on two find-
ings from the psychology literature: first,
that people care deeply about about hav-
ing a positive identity and reputation; sec-
ond, that people infer their identity at least
in part from past behavior, i.e., that peo-
ple infer their own preferences and values
in part from looking at past choices (Fiske
and Taylor 1991, Be´nabou and Tirole 2011).
Expanding on that literature, we hypothe-
size that firms can become effective ‘carri-
ers’ of identity and reputation since both
firm membership and firm actions are very
visible, and thus particularly salient sources
for these types of inferences. Moreover,
firms also enjoy scale effects – as the firm’s
actions reflect on many employees at once
– and are long-lived.
We explore the implications of these ideas
in a formal model that is sketched below
and discussed in more detail in the online
appendix. The key result of our analy-
sis is that firms that adopt a purpose can,
in fact, be more profitable than others, by
strengthening employees’ identity and rep-
utation. These profits flow from the fact
that employees accept lower wages - given
the identity and reputation benefits from
working for the firm - and that they also
exert more effort. This effect is driven by
a sorting mechanism that effectively ‘cre-
ates’ identity and reputation. If socially-
minded employees prefer to work for a firm
2Whereas the management literature has occasion-
ally connected firm purpose to corporate identity (e.g.,
Sisodia, Wolfe and Sheth (2007)), this paper is con-
cerned with individual identity and reputation. It is
also explicitly focused on – and is very precise about –
one particular mechanism that we believe to be critical.
While this may reduce generality, it also leads to more
crisp predictions and new insights.
3Purpose is not necessarily different from mission
but typically more concrete.
with purpose, then employees of such a firm
will tend to be socially-minded, which, in
its turn, will affect observers’ (and the em-
ployees’ own) inferences and beliefs about
the employees. Sorting combined with pur-
poseful action makes the employees iden-
tifiable as being socially minded and cre-
ates identity and reputation. (If employ-
ees were randomly allocated, firm purpose
would have no identity and reputation ef-
fects.) For sorting to occur, however, we
show that there must be a trade-off be-
tween profits and social impact: if the most
profitable actions are also the socially most
beneficial ones, then every firm will take so-
cial action and such actions will lose their
power to identify socially minded employees
and thus to create reputation and identity.
Thus industry profits and social action can
– paradoxically - actually increase when so-
cial actions become less profitable.
The article then derives a number of ad-
ditional insights. First, the key element
in this trade-off is the firm’s (opportunity)
cost of taking such action, as this is what
makes it a credible signal. This implies that
the reputation and identity effects can, in
principle, be independent of the impact of
the actions: even actions that may seem, at
first sight, symbolic could potentially play
this role – if they have sufficient signaling
value.4 Moreover, as the reputation and
identity effects are, in principle, also in-
dependent of the personal actions of em-
ployees (beyond joining the firm), even ac-
countants will care about the firm’s pur-
pose. Second, an important factor in mak-
ing the firm a more effective carrier of repu-
tation and identity is whether identity and
reputation are complements (in the util-
ity function). We would expect this to
be the case, since the psychology literature
strongly suggests that people value consis-
tency between identity and reputation. If
identity and reputation are complements,
employees who already have some inher-
ent prosocial identity will care more about
4Obviously, we expect cost and social impact to
be generally correlated since, in equilibrium, socially
minded firms will only select the most costly actions
if they have a large impact.
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developing a prosocial reputation and will
thus value joining a firm with purpose
more highly. Once they are members of
the firm, the same complementarity will
make them care even more about develop-
ing a prosocial identity. Inherently socially-
minded employees will thus (endogenously)
care more about having a prosocial iden-
tity and reputation than other employees.
A third insight of the model is that pur-
pose is ultimately made credible through
managers’ values and beliefs – which create
a relational contract by implicitly promis-
ing specific future actions in exchange for
lower wages and more effort (Gibbons and
Henderson 2013). Moreover, purpose gen-
erates in its turn corporate values and cul-
ture.
We now turn to a sketch of the formal
model and the results, with a more detailed
discussion in the online appendix.
I. Model Sketch
Consider a setting with N → ∞ firms,
each having 1 manager (M) and K em-
ployees (E). Whereas the manager is exoge-
nously attached to the firm, the employees
will be matched to the firm – as part of
the game (using the core) – from an infinite
pool of potential employees. Both man-
agers and employees have one of two types:
Social (S) or Asocial (A). Exactly one of
the managers and L potential employees in
the pool are of type S, with K < L <∞.
Each firm will take an action from the set
{Xh, Xl, Yl, Yh}, with each action Z having
both a monetary payoff PZ and a social im-
pact BZ (which captures a benefit to soci-
ety). The action is chosen either by a ran-
domly selected employee (each with proba-
bility ρ) or by the manager (with comple-
mentary probability 1 − Kρ ≥ 0). If an
employee chooses the action, then the man-
ager can overturn it at a cost δ ↓ 0 to both
the manager and the employee. The mon-
etary payoffs of the actions {Xh, Xl, Yl, Yh}
are respectively P, P − ,−P + , and −P
for some P >>  > 0. The social impacts
BZ are a permutation of {B,B, 0, 0} with
B > 0, where we will consider three cases:
1) positive correlation between BZ and PZ :
the social impacts of (Xh, Xl, Yl, Yh) are re-
spectively (B,B, 0, 0) (i.e., ‘doing well by
doing good’), 2) no correlation (which is
the most important case): the social im-
pacts are a randomly selected permutation
of (B,B, 0, 0) with all permutations equally
likely, and 3) negative correlation: the
respective social impacts are (0, 0, B,B).
When selected, an employee can also exert
effort (at personal cost c), which increases
the probability that the firm’s action is ‘ex-
ecuted’ – i.e., that it gives the payoff and
impact discussed above and that it is ob-
served – from ψ to (ψ + δ) ∈ (0, 1].
Whereas A-type players don’t care about
the social impact, S-type players who are
personally involved in the choice get a pri-
vate benefit γiBZ , with i ∈ {M,E}, γM > 0,
and γE ≥ 0. We will say that an employee
is personally involved when she is selected
to make the choice, whereas the manager
is always personally involved. In terms of
the monetary payoffs (or incentives), each
manager will get a share αM of her firm’s
overall profit Π (consisting of payoff PZ mi-
nus employee wages) plus a wage that we
normalize for simplicity to wM = 0. Em-
ployees get a share αE of monetary payoffs
PZ plus a wage wE that is determined in
the matching process, as part of the game.5
A key assumption of the model is that
employees care not only about αEPZ and
γEBZ but also about their identity and per-
sonal reputation, i.e., how they perceive
themselves and how they are perceived by
others.6 For some particular employee, let
µ and ν denote respectively that employee’s
belief and the belief of an outsider (who ob-
serves only this employee and her firm) that
the employee’s type is S. The employee
then gets an extra utility U(µ, ν) = λ(µ +
ν)+(1−λ)µν for λ ∈ [0, 1]. The fact that U
increases in µ and ν captures the desirabil-
ity of an S-reputation/identity, whereas the
5As with other elements of the model, the specific
assumptions are chosen to simplify the analysis. In this
case, for example, giving the employee αEΠ or the man-
ager αMPZ gives qualitatively similar results but with
more complex analysis.
6The online appendix shows how the results extend
when the manager also cares about identity and repu-
tation.
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complementarity between µ and ν reflects
people’s need for consistency between iden-
tity and reputation. The outsider forms his
belief based on public and common knowl-
edge about that employee: which firm the
employee belongs to, that firm’s action, and
the equilibrium. With regard to the em-
ployee’s belief about her own type, we make
a second key assumption, along the lines
of Be´nabou and Tirole (2011): employees
know their type when they make a payoff-
relevant decision but forget in the last pe-
riod with probability q everything except
for the public or common knowledge facts,
and then need to infer their type as if they
were an outsider.
Conditional on execution, the utility of
an A- and an S-manager is thus respectively
αMΠ and αMΠ+γMBZ ; the utility of an A-
employee and of an S-employee who does
not choose the action is αEPZ + U(µ, ν),
whereas the utility of an S-employee who
was selected to choose the action is αEPZ +
γEBZ + U(µ, ν).
The timeline of the game is then as fol-
lows:
1) Hiring and selection
a) Employees are allocated to firms
and wages are set according to a
core solution (with equal wages
within a firm). Non-matched
players get outside option w = 0
(plus U(µ, ν)).
b) One player is selected (to take ac-
tion) in each firm. Each employee
(resp. the manager) is selected
with probability ρ (resp. 1−Kρ).
2) Actions
a) If the selected player is an em-
ployee, she decides whether to ex-
ert effort at cost c.
b) The social impact of the four al-
ternatives are drawn and publicly
revealed.
c) The selected player chooses an ac-
tion.
d) The manager decides whether to
overturn the action.
3) Payoffs
a) With probability ψ, the chosen
action is executed and payoffs
realized. (With complementary
probability, the firm has no ac-
tion.)
b) With probability q, players forget
everything except for who belongs
to which firm, the firms’ actions,
and the equilibrium.
c) Payoffs and utilities are realized.
A few additional remarks are in order.
First, when there are multiple core solu-
tions, one is picked at random with all be-
ing equally likely. Second, employee wages
will be constrained to be identical within
one firm but can differ across firms, re-
flecting the fact that the manager’s type
is more likely to be publicly known than
that of a potential employee. We will
also make a few parametric assumption
that are explained in the online appendix:
αE, αM > 0, αM > αE, and P − /2 >
max{γMB, γEB,KU(1, 1)}.
The proposition below captures the main
insights from the analysis. A firm with an
S- or A-manager will be referred to as an
S- or A-firm.
PROPOSITION 1: • The S-firm is for
an outsider indistinguishable from the
A-firms in the case with positive cor-
relation (between PZ and BZ), and in
the cases with sufficiently low γMB.
• The S-firm can have higher profits than
the A-firms (even when ργEB = 0),
both in the case with no correlation and
in the case with negative correlation
and effort. In such cases, S-employees
have a social reputation and identity,
accept lower wages, and exert more ef-
fort. Industry profits are higher and
social impact can also be higher than
in the above case with indistinguishable
firms. The profit difference increases
in firm size K and employee involve-
ment ρ. With no correlation or effort,
profits are highest at intermediate lev-
els of γMB.
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• The S-firm has lower profits than the
A-firms in some (but not all) cases
with negative correlation – when S-
employees’ lower wages do not make up
for the lower monetary payoffs.
• Whenever λ = 1 (‘no complementar-
ity’) and ργEB = 0, the S-firm has
lower profits than the A-firms. In such
cases, the S-firm chooses the social ac-
tion, but its employees are randomly
drawn, have no social reputation, and
are paid the same as A-firm employees.
II. Conclusion
This article developed a theory in which
a firm’s adoption of a prosocial purpose can
increase profitability by strengthening em-
ployees’ reputation and identity – leading to
higher effort and lower wages – as long as
implementing purpose is costly with respect
to direct monetary payoffs. Employees who
value prosocial action will select into firms
with a social purpose, which then become a
visible carrier for these employees’ identity
and reputation.
While this model is consistent with many
of the stylized facts around firm purpose, it
also raises important questions for further
research, such as empirical tests of the the-
ory or further analysis of the relationship
to relational contracts or culture. We hope
that it inspires further work in this direc-
tion.
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